In this paper, we examine the effects of corporate governance mechanisms on financing policies in a research setting where agency problems and external financing constraints are expected to be high and restrictive. Using a unique self-constructed corporate governance index and employing the Fama and French (1999) financing model of firms, we find that firms with weak corporate governance mechanisms have more leverage than do firms with strong governance mechanisms. After controlling for the effects among corporate governance components, we observe that firms with different levels of corporate governance quality use different corporate governance mechanisms in relation to their financing policies. Our results suggest that firms can dynamically adjust their leverage as a governance mechanism through compensation policy and shareholder rights.
Introduction
Does corporate governance have significant impact on financing policy of a company?
This paper attempts to investigate this issue by examining financing patterns of firms with strong and weak corporate governance mechanisms in the New Zealand stock market where agency problems and external financing constraints are expected to be high and binding.
Our study is motivated on the premise that, not only because the literature on the relationship between corporate governance and firm financing policy is still inconclusive, but also because most extant studies in this literature mostly use a specific corporate governance provision as a proxy for corporate governance mechanism (see for example, Berger et al., 1997; Wen et al., 2002; Abor, 2007; Jiraporn and Liu, 2008; John and Litov, 2010) 1 . We posit that focusing only on a specific governance provision could be attributed to the mixed results as the literature also reports that firms could use a corporate governance component as a substitute or a complement to one another in addressing agency problems (Chen and Steiner, 1999; Chae, Kim and Lee, 2009; Eckbo and Verma, 1994; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Rediker and Seth, 1995; Klapper and Love, 2004; Miguel et al., 2005; Rutherford et al., 2007) . Firms with weak shareholder protection, for example, could improve investor protection by increasing disclosure, selecting a more independent board, aligning incentives or imposing disciplinary mechanism on the management (Klapper and Love, 2004; Ward et al., 2009) . Likewise, firms with staggered boards could also improve shareholder protection by limiting the dilution effects of stock options or non-voting shares. These findings suggest that focusing on only one specific aspect of corporate governance may explain the inconclusive results on the effects of governance mechanisms on financing policy.
Our study is different from prior studies in several aspects. First, we employ a comprehensive corporate governance index based on several corporate governance provisions from a sample of New Zealand companies. Employing a more comprehensive measure of corporate governance mechanism instead of focusing only on one particular aspect of corporate governance provision is expected to mitigate possible substitution or complementary effects of such provision with another. The only study using total governance index in relation to financing policy is Mande et al. (2012) . In our study, we use several governance sub-indices in addition to total index which enable us to examine which part of governance mechanisms is more relevant to firm financing policy. Second, we examine the impact of corporate governance of firms with strong and weak governance mechanisms on their financing policies. Focusing on these two extreme groups of firms is expected to facilitate us to draw more unequivocal inference from the results on the effects of corporate governance on financing policy. Third, our study is the first to look at the firms' financing policies using the Fama and French (1999) model. This approach not only enables us to observe whether firms with strong corporate governance scores use a different financing policy than do those with weak scores but also allows us to examine the effects of different corporate governance mechanisms on firms' financing policies as well as on their costs of capital. There is as yet limited empirical work on this issue; our paper fills this void, albeit for a country with a small and less-developed stock exchange, viz.: New Zealand.
New Zealand is a member of OECD countries but its market characteristics are different from those of the US. Although New Zealand has adopted the global best practice regarding corporate governance, there are significant institutional differences in New Zealand as compared to countries such as the UK and USA, which use similar corporate governance codes. Previous research has also indicated that institutional features and the level of financial development at the country level impact firms' performance and their access to external finance (see among others, La Porta et. al, 1997 and Love, 2003) . Chae, Kim and Lee (2009) find that external financing constraints can have significant effect on the relations among corporate governance, agency problem and financing policy. They report that depending on the relative sizes of agency problems and external financing constraints, firms may use governance mechanisms as a substitute or a complement for payout policy. New Zealand is a relatively much smaller economy where the capital markets are not nearly as well-developed, has a large number of firms having small market capitalisation, has all firm boards staggered and ownership concentration is extremely high. According to LaPorta (1997) and Love (2003) , all these characteristics are consistent with high agency problems and restrictive external financing constraints. Thus, our findings in this paper could have implications for firms in other comparable OECD countries especially those under common law jurisdictions.
We find, in line with the existing literature, that the cost of capital of firms with high corporate governance scores are significantly lower than those in firms with low scores. We further find that, using the overall corporate governance score index and its sub-components, firms with weak corporate governance provisions are more leveraged than are firms with good governance mechanisms. After controlling the effects of different corporate governance components, we report that firms with different levels of corporate governance quality use different corporate governance mechanisms in relation to their financing policy. Our results also suggest that, through their compensation policy and shareholder rights provisions, firms can dynamically adjust their leverage as a governance mechanism.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section two briefly discusses the literature and the hypotheses of this study. Section three describes the methodology and the data. Section four discusses the empirical findings and section five concludes the paper.
Literature review and hypothesis development
Prior studies in finance literature suggest that the financing policies of firms, which The literature also provides evidence that good corporate governance has positive effects on firm operating performance and on cash holding (Core, Holthausen and Larcker, 1999; Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2003; Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, 2007 
Methodology and Data
We construct a New Zealand Corporate Governance Index by creating three sub-indices for the following corporate governance mechanism: board composition, compensation policy, and shareholder rights. We then construct a total index by summing the values of the three sub-indices. The criteria we use to construct the sub-indices are similar to those of McFarland (2002) . 2 A clear benefit of constructing our own governance indicator is that we are able to capture a wide variety of governance features specific to New Zealand firms. A potential drawback of this approach is that the list of corporate governance features and the weights assigned to each feature may be considered arbitrary. However, this criticism could be applicable to any constructed index, whether for professional or academic purposes. Overall, we believe that our detailed scoring system takes into account a wide range of aspects of firm governance and therefore provides a realistic score. Furthermore, the criteria used to create each of the sub-indices were previously applied in the Canadian context by Klein et al. 2 See the appendix for details.
The board composition sub-index measures board independence, CEO duality, busyness of the directors and the number of annual board meetings. This provision is an important governance feature (Fama and Jensen, 1983) . The main responsibility of the board is to monitor managers' performance and reduce agency costs. Autonomy is measured by board independence, and by the independence of audit, compensation and nominating committees. Independent directors are expected to be able to monitor managers more effectively than inside directors (Jensen, 1993; Fama, 1980; and Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990 suggest when shareholder rights are strong, shareholders can use their power to force managers to pay higher dividends instead of using them for private benefit. Thus containing managers' opportunistic behavior is likely to make the firm less risky, ceteris paribus.
Overall, we believe that these three major components of corporate governance aggregated into an overall score could provide a superior measure of corporate governance.
To observe a firm's financing pattern and its cost of capital, we adopt Fama and
French's (1999) methodology. We use the following equation to observe how a firm finances itself:
Y t is defined as the sum of income before extraordinary items, interest, income statement deferred taxes and depreciation. Dep t is the depreciation expenses. ∆S t is the net newly issued shares, which balances the cash flow. ∆LTD t is the change in the book value of the long-term debt. I t is the change in book capital from t-1 to year t, plus depreciation. Int t is the total interest expenses paid to creditors. Div t is the total dividends paid to shareholders. All of the variables are deflated by the value of the year-beginning book assets. We do not include the change in short-term interest bearing liabilities in this equation because data for this variable are not available. As a result, we could slightly overstate ∆S t . However, as the change in short-term interest bearing liabilities is usually small, this omission should not have a significant impact on ∆S t .
To measure firms' cost of capital of firms for each year, we estimate the following equation:
IV t-1 is the initial market value of a firm's capital in the sample at year t-1. We calculate the market value of a firm as the sum of its equity plus the book values of short-term and longterm debts. Y, I and LTD are as defined above. FS, FB and TV are the dollar amounts of the shares issued, buybacks and the market value capital of the firms, respectively; whereas r is the firm's cost of capital.
We then sort firms according to each index to observe whether firms in the top 33% of each index which are defined as firms with strong corporate governance, have a different financing pattern than that of firms in the bottom 33%, defined as firms with weak corporate governance.
To investigate whether firms with strong corporate governance mechanisms have different financing policies than those of firms with weak governance mechanisms, we run the following regression model: number of sample firms in our study is similar to that in prior studies on New Zealand firms (Orr et al., 2005; Hossain et al., 2000) . We trim data that do not have the necessary variables for the regression and extreme firm variables that are below the 1 st percentile and above the 99 th percentile. Our final sample consists of 319 firm year observations. the dividend policies of both types of firm are similar, suggesting that firms in our sample do not use dividends as a governance mechanism but, as new Zealand adopts an imputation tax system, dividends could be used for tax-related purposes .
Results
[Please Insert Table 3 Here]
In Table 4 , we report correlation matrices for the total corporate governance index, its subindices and selected control variables used in the regression model. The total index is positively correlated with its components. Board index is highly correlated with total index as it represents 47% of the total index 5 . The components of total index display low correlation among themselves. Thus, we are assured that the components of corporate governance that we evaluated assess the different aspects of corporate governance and do not cause serious measurement problems. Board monitoring is negatively correlated with compensation policy but positively correlated with shareholder rights. The compensation policy index is negatively correlated with shareholder rights. The signs of the correlation coefficients of the components of the total index suggest that these governance mechanisms could act as substitutes or complements (Ward et al., 2009 ).
[Please Insert Table 4 Here] Table 3 6 .
[Please Insert Table 5 Here]
Summary
Our paper examines the effects of corporate governance mechanisms on financing policy. We find that cost of capital of firms with a high corporate governance score is significantly lower than those of firms with a low governance score. We further find that firms with weak corporate governance mechanisms are more leveraged than are firms with strong governance mechanisms. After controlling for the effects among the corporate governance mechanisms, 6 15 observations have negative PBI, therefore we set this variable to zero. The results are similar when we deleted the observations. The results are available upon request.
we observe that firms with different levels of corporate governance quality use different corporate governance mechanisms in relation to their financing policy. We report that through their compensation policy and shareholder rights, firms can dynamically adjust their leverage as a governance mechanism. Finally, we also find evidence suggesting that compensation policy and shareholder rights are substitutes for one another.
Appendix: Components of Corporate Governance Index

Sub-Index 1: Board composition Maximum marks: 40 marks
Independent 8 marks for boards with at least 66% independent directors. 4 marks if 50% or more are independent.
0 mark if less than 50% are independent.
Audit committee 6 marks if the committee is fully independent.
2 if there are one or more related directors.
0 if a member of management is on the committee.
Compensation committee 4 marks if the committee is fully independent.
Nominating committee 3 marks if the committee is fully independent.
0 if a member of management is on the committee. 2 marks if the chairman is also a related director.
3 marks if the jobs are not split, but there is an independent lead director.
Relationship among directors Start with 5 marks.
Minus 3 if marks if the CEO swaps board with the CEO of another company.
Minus 2 marks if 3 or more directors are together on the board of another public company.
Minus 2 marks if any director who is on more than 8 other for-profit corporate boards. (score can go below zero).
CEO commitment 2 marks if the CEO sits on 3 or fewer other boards of public company.
0 mark if more than 3.
Formal system of board performance 2 marks if any.
0 if there is no such system.
Board meeting without management present 2 marks if yes, 0 mark if no.
3 marks if the information is disclosed and both the board and audit Number of board meetings committee meets at least 4 times.
1 mark if they meet less often, or if only partial number information about the number of meeting.
0 mark if this information is not disclosed.
Sub-Index 2: Shareholding and compensation issues Maximum marks: 23 marks
Directors required to own stock (stock option don't count) 4 marks if share ownership is mandatory an equals at least 3 times the annual retainer paid to directors.
2 marks if mandatory but ownership is lower.
0 mark if ownership is not mandatory.
Director own stock Start with 4 marks.
Minus 1 mark if each director has less than 1,000 shares after sitting on the board for at least a year. (Can go below zero).
CEO required to own stock (stock options don't count) 3 marks if required, or if the CEO is the controlling shareholder of the firm.
CEO own shares 3 marks if the CEO owns more than 50,000 shares after 2 years on the job.
2 marks if more than 20,000 shares. 
Sub-Index 3: Shareholder rights policy Maximum marks: 22 marks
Re-election of directors 2 marks for annual election of all directors. 0 mark for staggered boards.
Stock option dilutive 8 marks if dilution is <5% of outstanding shares.
6 marks if dilution is between 5% and 10%.
0 mark if dilution is more than 10%.
Option re-priced, exercise date extended or exchanged for lower priced option 4 marks if no.
0 mark if yes.
Voting shares 8 marks if there are no non-voting or subordinate voting shares.
0 mark if voting control is 5 times greater than the ownership stake. Equity1 is the market value of equity as proportions of a firm's market capital. LTD1 is the book value of long-term debt as proportions of a firm's market capital. Market capital is the sum of the market value of its common stock plus the book value of its short-term and long-term debts. Equity2 is the book value of equity as proportions of a firm's book capital. LTD2 is the book value of long-term debt as proportions of a firm's book capital. Book capital is the sum of the book value of its common equity plus the book value of its short-term and long-term debts. Y is defined as the sum of income before extraordinary items, extraordinary item, interest, income statement deferred taxes and depreciation. Dep is depreciation expenses. ∆S is the net new issues of shares which balance the cash flows. ∆LTD is the change in the book value of long-term debt. I is the change in book capital from t-t to year t, plus depreciation. Int is total interest expenses paid to creditors. Div is total dividends paid to shareholders. 0.12 0.18*** 0.16 0.21** Notes: A firm's market capital is the sum of the market value of its common stock plus the book value of its short-term and long-term debts. A firm's book capital is the sum of the book value of its common equity plus the book value of its short-term and long-term debts. Firms in the top (bottom) 33% sorted based on the corresponding corporate governance index are classified as strong (weak) governed firms.
*,**,*** denote significantly different from their counterparts at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively (for two-tail tests). Significance is reported for full period only. Notes: Y t is defined as the sum of income before extraordinary items, extraordinary item, interest, income statement deferred taxes and depreciation. Dep t is depreciation expenses. ∆S t is the net new issues of shares which balance the cash flows. ∆LTD t is the change in the book value of long-term debt. I t is the change in book capital from t-1 to year t, plus depreciation. Int t is total interest expenses paid to creditors. Div t is total dividends paid to shareholders. COC is cost of capital. Firms in the top (bottom) 33% sorted based on the corresponding corporate governance index are classified as strong (weak) governed firms.
*,**,*** denote significantly different from their counterparts at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively (for two-tail tests assuming unequal variance).
Significance is reported for full period only. ∆LTD is change in long term debt. BOARD is board composition sub-index. COMP is compensation policy subindex. RIGHTS is shareholder rights sub-index. Total index is the sum of all three sub-indices. BLOCK is the cumulative percentage of shares held by shareholders holding at least 5% of ordinary shares in the firm. TA, IE, PBI and TTURN are natural logarithms of total assets, interest expenses, profit before interest and total sales, respectively. All these variables except ∆LTD are measured at t-1. Table 5 The association between corporate governance mechanisms and financing policy sorted based on total corporate governance index and its sub-indices The dependent variable is change in long term debt. DBOARD_Low is a dummy of 1 for firms in the bottom 33% when sorted according to the values of each index and 0 otherwise, DBOARD_High is a dummy of 1 for firms in the top 33% when sorted according to the values of each index and 0 otherwise, BOARD is Board Index, DCOMP_Low is a dummy of 1 for firms in the bottom 33% when sorted according to the values of each index and 0 otherwise, DCOMP_High is a dummy of 1 for firms in the top 33% when sorted according to the values of each index and 0 otherwise, COMP is Compensation Policy Index, DRIGHTS_Low is a dummy of 1 for firms in the bottom 33% when sorted according to the values of each index and 0 otherwise, DRIGHTS_High is a dummy of 1 for firms in the top 33% when sorted according to the values of each index and 0 otherwise, RIGHTS is Shareholder Rights Index. IE, PBI, TTURN and TA respectively are the natural logarithms of Interest Expenses, Profit before Interest, Total Turnover and Total Assets. *, **, *** are significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
